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COMMENTS
SALES, ACQUISITIONS, AND MERGERS OF
DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC




Direct-to-consumer genetic tests have become increasingly popular in the
United States within the last few years. However, these tests pose many risks to
the consumer, most notably privacy risks. A subset of these privacy risks in-
volves the issue of company mergers, acquisitions, and sales. Many companies
in the direct-to-consumer genetic testing market have privacy policies that con-
tain a variation of a “business transfer” clause. These clauses specify that in
the event the company goes through a business transition such as a sale,
merger, or acquisition, the consumer’s personal information—including the
consumer’s DNA—will be among the assets transferred. This Article explores
the risks associated with these business transfer clauses as they relate to the
consumer, and presents a solution to mitigate said risks. The solution lies in
FTC v. Toysmart, wherein a toy company that filed for bankruptcy was re-
stricted in selling its assets—which included its customers’ personal data—
only to entities with the same interests as the toy company. This Article urges
that the default interpretation standard of business transfer clauses track simi-
larly such that a direct-to-consumer genetic testing company may only be sold
to, merged with, or acquired by a company with the same or like interests.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404 R
II. PRIVACY POLICIES AND THE “BUSINESS TRANSFER”
CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408 R
A. A Breakdown of the Business Transfer Clause . . . . . . 408 R
B. Risks Associated with the Business Transfer Clause . 410 R
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE . . . . . . 413 R
IV. A SOLUTION TO THE BUSINESS TRANSFER CLAUSE . . . . . 416 R
A. Default Interpretation Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416 R
B. Types of Companies with “Like Interests” . . . . . . . . . . 419 R
C. Conformity to Industry Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 R
V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421 R
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V8.I2.5
* J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law, May 2021. I would like
to thank my advisor, Professor H. Brian Holland, and my Notes & Comments Editor,
Kameron Smith, for helping me develop my thoughts and ideas. I would also like to
thank my mother, Janet Alleman, for her unwavering love and encouragement, and
Christopher Moehring for his sacrifice and support throughout law school.
403
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-2\TWL204.txt unknown Seq: 2  3-FEB-21 13:42
404 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
I. INTRODUCTION
Direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) genetic tests have become increas-
ingly popular over the last few years, and there seems to be no stop-
ping point in sight. When the first DTC genetic test hit the market in
1996, the concept was not only novel, but also ambitious.1 That con-
sumers could simply send off a cheek swab and then receive a com-
plete depiction of their human genome was a profound idea; nothing
like it had ever been offered to consumers before.2 However, consum-
ers did not seem all too interested, as the industry for DTC genetic
tests grew relatively slowly at first, and the purchase of these tests
seemed reserved for a few wealthy individuals.3 Additionally, many
medical experts warned consumers to view these tests with caution, as
there was little evidence that results were “clinically useful” and many
of the potential risks were unknown.4 But the world would change
almost twenty-five years later.
Despite the slow start, the market for DTC genetic tests has grown
dramatically in the last few years.5 The number of consumers who
used a DTC genetic test “more than doubled during 2017” and ex-
ceeded twelve million in 2018.6 Genealogy has grown so much that as
of 2018 it became America’s most popular hobby and one of the top
trending topics for internet surfers.7
The sudden growth in the popularity of DTC genetic tests can be
attributed to the changing landscape of the market. Today, not only
are more DTC genetic tests readily available than ever before, but
these tests are also cheaper.8 For example, 23andMe, a well-known
and leading company in the market, now charges customers only $99
for its services, compared to the original price of $999 in 2007.9 Addi-
tionally, taking one of these DTC genetic tests is convenient and fairly
straightforward. DTC genetic testing can be done from the comfort of
the consumer’s home, without any involvement of a healthcare pro-
1. Scott Bowen & Muin J. Khoury, Consumer Genetic Testing Is Booming: But
What Are the Benefits and Harms to Individuals and Populations?, CTRS. FOR DIS-





5. Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, MIT
TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/02/12/145676/
2017-was-the-year-consumer-dna-testing-blew-up/ [https://perma.cc/6B8E-DX3R].
6. Id.
7. Bowen & Khoury, supra note 1; see also Gregory Rodriguez, How Genealogy
Became Almost as Popular as Porn, TIME (May 30, 2014, 12:01 AM), https://time.com/
133811/how-genealogy-became-almost-as-popular-as-porn/ [https://perma.cc/UW3Q-
3EGU].
8. See J. Scott Roberts & Jenny Ostergren, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing
and Personal Genomics Services: A Review of Recent Empirical Studies, 1 CURRENT
GENETIC MED. REPS. 182 (2013).
9. Id.
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vider.10 A typical consumer purchases a test online from one of the
many companies to choose from, is mailed an at-home collection kit
by said company, and provides a DNA sample, usually in the form of
saliva through a cheek swab.11 Once the test results are in (usually
several weeks later), the consumer can access them online through the
company’s website.12
DTC genetic testing provides consumers with various forms of data
related to genealogy, ancestry, or health predictions.13 Most consum-
ers use these at-home DNA tests to reveal ancestral and familial rela-
tionships, and while many seek to learn about their ancestral origins,
others hope to find unknown blood relatives.14 A simple at-home ge-
netic test may provide the consumer with several benefits, including
individualized knowledge of a particular disease’s likelihood (e.g., dia-
betes, heart disease, or cancer), disease screening, health-risk evalua-
tion, and even suggestions for lifestyle changes, diets, dietary
supplements, or medications.15 Further, some companies even claim
that their tests can provide information about how a consumer’s body
will respond to a specific treatment or drug.16
While DTC genetic tests provide many benefits, they do not come
without risks. When consumers take one of these tests and send in
their DNA sample, they are providing the applicable company with
important, sensitive information about themselves. Your DNA is a
blueprint of your life;17 it discloses “what makes you you.”18 Not only
does your DNA reveal information about yourself, including your her-
itage and your health, but it also reveals information about your blood
relatives.19 Because DNA can provide a nearly limitless amount of
personal, sensitive information, allowing companies access to your
DNA poses many risks, most notably privacy risks. Placing a con-
10. See Letter from Nathan Hopkins, Legis. Analyst, Minnesota House of Reps.,
to Members of the Legis. Comm’n on Data Practices and Personal Data Priv. (Nov.
15, 2018) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Nathan Hopkins]; James W.
Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of the Pri-
vacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 28
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 38 (2018).
11. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 10, at 38.
12. Id.
13. Letter from Nathan Hopkins, supra note 10.
14. Ellen Wright Clayton et al., The Law of Genetic Privacy: Applications, Impli-
cations, and Limitations, 6 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 16 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/
lsz007.




17. JUSTICE MING W. CHIN ET AL., FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND THE
LAW § 13:13, Westlaw TRG-DNA (database updated June 2020).
18. Lesley Fair, DNA Test Kits: Consider the Privacy Implications, FED. TRADE
COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/
12/dna-test-kits-consider-privacy-implications [https://perma.cc/T2TB-SWX4].
19. CHIN ET AL., supra note 17.
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sumer’s DNA in the wrong hands could really damage that person’s
well-being.20 In fact, consumers recognize privacy risks as one of their
main concerns, with a 2016 study showing that 65% of DTC genetic
test users worry about their personal data being shared with third-
party companies.21 Further, many consumers are unaware of what, if
any, privacy policies guide the use of their DNA by the applicable
company. While many industry leaders provide policy statements, a
2017 survey analyzing the privacy policies proffered by U.S. DTC ge-
netic testing companies (“2017 Survey”) revealed that of the ninety
companies surveyed, just under 40% failed to provide any information
to consumers regarding their genetic data policies or what would be-
come of consumer DNA samples.22
These risks are only heightened by the fact that third parties may
have access to a customer’s DNA. Of the companies that do provide
comprehensive policy statements, many fail to specify what informa-
tion will be shared with third parties. In fact, out of the fifty-five com-
panies in the 2017 Survey with policies addressing DNA, just under
half of the companies’ policies specified that data would or could be
shared with third parties.23 Additionally, eighteen companies specifi-
cally provided that the customer’s deidentified data would be shared
with third parties without the customer’s consent.24
Further, consumers might be even more shocked to know that their
DNA could be sold to a third party. Many DTC genetic testing com-
panies have what is called a “business transfer” clause in their privacy
policies that allows them to transfer all of their assets—which includes
the consumer’s DNA—to another entity in the event of a sale, merger,
or acquisition.25 This means that if these companies, such as 23andMe
or Ancestry.com, were to merge with, sell to, or be acquired by an-
other company, 23andMe or Ancestry.com have the right to transfer
all of their assets to the acquiring entity, including the customer’s per-
sonal information and, critically, the customer’s DNA sample.26 For
example, there is nothing stopping 23andMe from selling to a massive,
well-known company like Facebook. In that case, Facebook would
then not only have all of the user’s personal and social information
but would now also have the user’s DNA. There is no telling what a
company like Facebook would be able to do with all of that
information.
20. June Mary Z. Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New Tort?, 34
CREIGHTON L. REV. 965, 965–66 (2001).
21. LAUREN FRIEND ET AL., KPMG INT’L, DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TEST-
ING 6 (2018), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/08/direct-to-consu
mer-genetic-testing.pdf [https://perma.cc/P454-34BD].
22. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 10, at 48.
23. Id. at 55.
24. Id.
25. See discussion infra Part II.
26. See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 10, at 56.
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Finally, as if these business transfer clauses do not pose enough
risks on their own, the risks become heightened when one realizes
that hardly any regulations, at either the state or federal level, exist
that address the risks posed by these business transfer clauses.27 While
there are some regulations that address genetic privacy concerns in
general or as they relate to healthcare and the workplace, none of
them cover privacy concerns relating to DTC genetic testing.28 Nor do
any of the regulations address the business transfer clause
specifically.29
This Article offers a new solution to combat the risks posed by
these business transfer clauses contained in the privacy policies of
DTC genetic testing companies. Drawing from FTC v. Toys-
mart.com,30 this Article urges that these business transfer clauses be
interpreted as allowing the genetic testing company to sell to, merge
with, or be acquired by only those companies that have like interests
as those of the genetic testing company.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part II, I explore some of
the privacy policies proffered by DTC genetic testing companies, pay-
ing special attention to the business transfer clauses contained in
them. I break down the business transfer clause as it applies to DTC
genetic testing companies. I then address and analyze the inherent
risks that these clauses pose, particularly as they relate to the
consumer.
In Part III, I provide an overview of the current legal landscape that
makes up the genetic testing market. I discuss how the current regula-
tions, at both the federal and state level, fail to address genetic privacy
concerns relating to DTC genetic testing generally, as well as to busi-
ness transfer clauses. While these regulations address genetic privacy
concerns as they relate to discrimination in healthcare and in the
workplace, they fail to address the privacy issues that consumers in the
DTC genetic testing market experience, and more specifically, the
risks that the business transfer clause poses to the consumer.
In Part IV, I propose a solution to combat the risks associated with
the business transfer clause. I argue that these genetic testing compa-
nies should adopt a default interpretation standard, whereby these
companies will interpret the business transfer clause as allowing them
to sell to, merge with, or be acquired by only companies that have like
interests as those of the genetic testing company. A similar conclusion
was reached in FTC v. Toysmart.com, in which the parties stipulated
in federal bankruptcy court that the defendant, Toysmart, could only
sell or assign its assets, including its customers’ personal information,
27. See discussion infra Part III.
28. See discussion infra Part III.
29. See discussion infra Part III.
30. FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-11341-RGS, 2000 WL 34016434 (D. Mass.
July 21, 2000).
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to a company with like interests as those of Toysmart.31 I discuss how
the Toysmart.com litigation provides a framework for mitigating the
risks associated with business transfer clauses that are contained in the
privacy policies of DTC genetic testing companies. I then explore dif-
ferent types of companies that could be considered as having “like
interests” as those of DTC genetic testing companies. Finally, I ex-
plain how the solution proposed here is in line with industry best
practices.
II. PRIVACY POLICIES AND THE “BUSINESS TRANSFER” CLAUSE
There are numerous companies that provide DTC genetic testing
services, and many of them provide consumers with easily accessible
policy documents, such as privacy policies and terms of service docu-
ments. Most companies publish privacy documents, including privacy
policies and service terms, on their websites.32 In fact, of the ninety
companies in the 2017 Survey, 90% had readily accessible privacy doc-
uments.33 These documents usually discuss the type of information
that the company collects, how it stores and uses the information, and
how it attempts to keep the information safe.34 In addition, these pri-
vacy documents are generally easy to find. A consumer can do a quick
Google search and have access to a company’s full privacy document
and terms of service document.35
A. A Breakdown of the Business Transfer Clause
One of the common provisions included in these privacy policy doc-
uments can be referred to as a “business transfer” clause. A business
transfer clause specifies what will happen to a company’s assets, in-
cluding company data, when the company decides to merge with an-
other company or sell all of its assets.36 The business transfer clause
establishes whether the new company will have rights to consumer
data and sets forth any transfer terms and notice requirements for the
data.37 In regard to the business transfer clauses provided in DTC ge-
netic testing companies’ policy statements, these clauses spell out what
will happen to a company’s assets when the company goes through a
31. In re Toysmart LLC, No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr. E.D. Mass. filed July 21,
2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/toysmarttbankruptcy.
1.htm [https://perma.cc/YVG5-B2Q6] (“Stipulation and Order Establishing Condi-
tions On Sale Of Customer Information”).
32. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 10, at 48.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 45.
35. See id. at 45 n.59, 48.




\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-2\TWL204.txt unknown Seq: 7  3-FEB-21 13:42
2021] THE RISKS AND A SOLUTION 409
sale, merger, or acquisition.38 Notably, a company’s assets include all
of its customers’ DNA.39 Therefore, part of the assets that will be
transferred to the purchasing or acquiring entity includes customers’
DNA. Many companies’ privacy statements explicitly provide for
this.40 While not every company in the market has some form or varia-
tion of a business transfer clause—despite the constant evolution of
the market with mergers and acquisitions being commonplace—the
companies that do specify that the consumer’s data would be trans-
ferred to the other entity.41 Of the companies in the 2017 Study with
business transfer clauses, all provided that the consumer’s data would
or could be transferred in a merger or sale just like other company
assets.42
While not every DTC genetic testing company has some form of a
business transfer clause, many of the larger companies in the at-home
DNA testing market do. Two of the largest companies in the market,
Ancestry.com and 23andMe,43 both contain a variation of a business
transfer clause in their policy statements. Ancestry.com has a section
in its privacy statement titled, “If Ancestry is Acquired,” which states:
If Ancestry or its businesses are acquired or transferred (including
in connection with bankruptcy or similar proceedings), we will share
your Personal Information with the acquiring or receiving entity.
The promises in this Privacy Statement will continue to apply to
your Personal Information that is transferred to the new entity.44
Similarly, 23andMe’s full privacy statement contains a “Business
Transactions” section, which states:
In the event that 23andMe goes through a business transition such
as a merger, acquisition by another company, or sale of all or a por-
tion of its assets your Personal Information will likely be among the
assets transferred. In such a case, your information would remain
subject to the promises made in any pre-existing Privacy
Statement.45
38. See, e.g., Your Privacy, ANC., https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystate-
ment [https://perma.cc/N3V7-F7MB] [hereinafter Ancestry Privacy Policy]; Privacy
Highlights, 23ANDME (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/
[https://perma.cc/A5TA-GTUX] [hereinafter 23andMe Privacy Policy].
39. See 23andMe Privacy Policy, supra note 38 (defining “Personal Information”
as including “Genetic Information” which includes the customer’s DNA sample); see
also Ancestry Privacy Policy, supra note 38 (stating “[y]our DNA Data and any infor-
mation derived from it . . . are Personal Information and referred to as ‘Genetic
Information’”).
40. See Ancestry Privacy Policy, supra note 38; see also 23andMe Privacy Policy,
supra note 38.
41. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 10, at 56.
42. Id.
43. Regalado, supra note 5.
44. Ancestry Privacy Policy, supra note 38.
45. 23andMe Privacy Policy, supra note 38.
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Both of these companies’ privacy policies explicitly state that “Per-
sonal Information” includes the customer’s “Genetic Information.”46
Further, many other large, well-known DTC genetic testing compa-
nies also contain a variation of a business transfer clause in their pri-
vacy policies.47
B. Risks Associated with the Business Transfer Clause
The business transfer clause and variations of it pose many risks to
the consumer, specifically when it comes to the sharing of the con-
sumer’s private and personal information. These business transfer
clauses allow DTC genetic testing companies to transfer all of a cus-
tomer’s personal information—including the customer’s DNA—to the
acquiring entity.48 For example, if 23andMe or Ancestry.com were to
merge with, sell to, or be acquired by another company, 23andMe and
Ancestry.com would have the right to transfer all of their assets to the
acquiring company, which includes not only the customer’s personal
information such as name, address, date of birth, sexual orientation,
ethnicity, etc., but also the customer’s DNA and the subsequent find-
ings and results from the provided DNA sample.49
Further, these business transfer clauses fail to place any limitations
on the type of company the DTC genetic testing company may sell to,
merge with, or be acquired by. If a company like 23andMe or Ances-
try.com wanted to sell to a company like Apple or Facebook, there is
nothing in their policy statements to stop them from doing so. Moreo-
ver, there is also nothing stopping them from sharing all of their cus-
tomers’ personal information—including the customers’ DNA—with
these companies. In fact, 23andMe and Ancestry.com even state in
their versions of the business transfer clause that they have the right
46. See Ancestry Privacy Policy, supra note 38; see also 23andMe Privacy Policy,
supra note 38.
47. See, e.g., MyHeritage Privacy Policy, MYHERITAGE, https://www.myheritage.
com/privacy-policy (Dec. 31, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9ZRJ-XPM3] (“[I]n the event
that MyHeritage, or substantially all of its assets or stock are acquired, personal infor-
mation will as a matter of course be one of the transferred assets. In such event, your
information would remain subject to the promises made in the pre-existing Privacy
Policy prior to the event.”); FamilyTreeDNA Privacy Statement, FAMILYTREEDNA,
https://www.familytreedna.com/legal/privacy-statement (May 7, 2019) [https://
perma.cc/H9FJ-J7CS] (“If FamilyTreeDNA or its businesses are acquired or trans-
ferred to another entity (in part or in whole and including in connection with any
bankruptcy or similar proceedings), we will share your Personal Information with that
entity. The promises in this Privacy Statement will apply to your Personal Information
as transferred to the new entity.”).
48. See Ancestry Privacy Policy, supra note 38; see also 23andMe Privacy Policy,
supra note 38.
49. See Ancestry Privacy Policy, supra note 38; see also 23andMe Privacy Policy,
supra note 38.
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to, and will in fact, transfer all of their customers’ personal informa-
tion to the third-party company.50
Additionally, the risks posed to the consumer are heightened by the
volatility of the DTC genetic testing market. Because businesses in
this industry regularly enter and exit the market, mergers and acquisi-
tions are commonplace.51 Therefore, the risks posed by the business
transfer clause seem even greater due to the increased likelihood that
a company will in fact go through a sale, merger, or acquisition and
thus transfer the customer’s data, including the customer’s DNA.
Some companies in the market are already linked to very large,
well-known businesses. In fact, Ancestry.com partners with the
Google subsidiary, Calico, for research.52 Calico researches medical
interventions that will help humans live longer and healthier.53 While
Calico’s purpose seems cutting edge, the company “discloses little
about its DNA work, and many view it as a vanity project for . . .
billionaires seeking breakthroughs to extend their own lives.”54 No
matter your stance on the type of research that Calico engages in, it is
easy to see the risks that this type of relationship poses to the cus-
tomer. By sharing the customer’s DNA with a third party such as Cal-
ico, Ancestry.com is increasing the likelihood that the customer’s
DNA will be compromised, with many experts concerned about steal-
ing and exploitation.55
Ancestry.com is not the only company in the market that is linked
to a larger company. 23andMe partnered with the pharmaceutical
company, GlaxoSmithKline, providing the company with access to
23andMe’s large collection of genetic data to create new drugs.56 By
partnering with and sharing the customer’s DNA with these third-
party companies, Ancestry.com and 23andMe are essentially magnify-
ing the risk of the customer’s genetic information being misused.57
Simply, information transfer is always susceptible to unintended third-
party interception.58
50. See Ancestry Privacy Policy, supra note 38; see also 23andMe Privacy Policy,
supra note 38.
51. Andelka M. Phillips, ‘Only a Click Away—DTC Genetics for Ancestry, Health,
Love . . . and More: A View of the Business and Regulatory Landscape’, 8 APPLIED &
TRANSLATIONAL GENOMICS 16, 16, 22 (2016).
52. Stuart Leavenworth, Who Is the Secretive Google Subsidiary with Access to
Ancestry’s DNA Database?, CONSUMER WATCHDOG (June 1, 2018), https://consumer
watchdog.org/news-story/who-secretive-google-subsidiary-has-access-ancestrys-dna-
database [https://perma.cc/A73Q-CG6F].
53. Understanding the Biology of Aging and Longevity, CALICO, https://
www.calicolabs.com/research-technology [https://perma.cc/86UM-GG34].
54. Leavenworth, supra note 52.
55. Id.
56. Jamie Ducharme, A Major Drug Company Now Has Access to 23andMe’s Ge-
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The risks increase even further by the fact that not all of these busi-
ness transfer clauses address whether the acquiring or purchasing
company will be bound by the same privacy policies contained in the
original privacy statements that the consumer agreed to. While many
large DTC genetic testing companies contain language in their privacy
statements that address this concern, it is certainly not widespread.59
23andMe’s privacy statement specifies that in the event of a merger,
acquisition, or sale, the consumer’s information “would remain sub-
ject to the promises made in any pre-existing Privacy Statement.”60
Ancestry.com contains a similar provision in its privacy statement that
says “[t]he promises in this Privacy Statement will continue to apply to
your Personal Information that is transferred to the new entity.”61
Other large, well-known DTC genetic testing companies also contain
similar language in their privacy policies.62 While it is reassuring to see
that some of the larger companies in the market do contain language
addressing whether the new entity will be bound by the same privacy
policies, it is not commonplace.63 The 2017 Survey revealed that of the
companies that had a policy regarding the fate of the consumer’s data
in the event of sale, merger, or acquisition, just over half of these
called for the acquiring company to adhere to the current privacy poli-
cies in effect at the time of transaction.64 Therefore, a little less than
half of the companies surveyed failed to address whether the acquir-
ing or purchasing company would be bound by the same privacy
policies.
Despite the overwhelming concerns these business transfer clauses
present, one might argue that they actually pose no risk to the con-
sumer, as the consumer consents to the business transfer clause by
agreeing to the privacy policy and terms of conditions offered by the
applicable company. After all, the consumer must agree to such provi-
sions before sending in his or her sample or purchasing one of the
DNA testing kits. However, it is often the case that consumers do not
actually read or understand these policies, and therefore they do not
necessarily realize what they are in fact consenting to.
These agreements normally present themselves as “click-wrap,”
which requires the consumer to indicate consent to the policy upon
purchase, or similarly “browser-wrap,” which means the consumer’s
consent is implied from using the company’s website.65 The United
States currently operates under a self-regulatory “Notice and Choice”
framework, meaning that when the consumer clicks “I agree,” or sim-
59. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 10, at 56.
60. 23andMe Privacy Policy, supra note 38.
61. Ancestry Privacy Policy, supra note 38.
62. See MyHeritage Privacy Policy, supra note 47; see also FamilyTreeDNA Pri-
vacy Statement, supra note 47.
63. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 10, at 56.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 38.
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ply proceeds to use the company’s services, the consumer has suffi-
ciently provided consent.66 However, consumers are largely unaware
of the contents of these agreements, and therefore lack informed con-
sent.67 Many scholars have criticized this method of consent for “leav-
ing users uninformed—or misinformed, as people rarely see, read, or
understand privacy policies.”68 Additionally, even if consumers actu-
ally read the policies, they tend to misunderstand them because the
policies are usually lengthy and contain legalese.69 Therefore, consum-
ers reading these policies are prone to incorrectly assuming that the
company will protect their privacy.70 Thus, while the consumer may
“consent” to the terms and conditions contained in the privacy state-
ments offered by DTC genetic testing companies, consumers may not
actually understand or realize what they are in fact consenting to.
The business transfer clause clearly poses many risks to the con-
sumer, risks that are heightened by the rapidly growing genetic testing
market. Even more concerning is that these risks are relatively unad-
dressed in the legal context. As will be explained in the following Part,
there are little to zero regulations or laws in place, at either the fed-
eral or state level, that specifically address the business transfer
clauses contained in DTC genetic testing companies’ privacy policies.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Despite the immense amount of risks associated with DTC genetic
testing, and specifically business transfer clauses, there are few regula-
tions that address privacy concerns for genetic testing in general, let
alone privacy concerns related to DTC genetic testing. The need for
privacy protection related to genetic information has long been recog-
nized, with federal legislators proposing genetic privacy legislation be-
ginning in 1991.71 Despite this necessity, scholars are concerned that
existing laws inadequately protect consumer privacy.72 The current le-
gal landscape of genetic privacy can be broken down by federal and
state level.
There are some federal laws that address genetic privacy concerns;
however, they either address privacy in general or genetic privacy as it
relates to discriminatory use.73 One would think that the Privacy Act
of 1974 would cover genetics, but that is not the case.74 This Act aims
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice
and Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 491 (2015).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Makdisi, supra note 20, at 975.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 975–76; see generally Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat.
1896 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
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generally to protect privacy but does not specifically address genetic
privacy concerns.75 Further, one could also look to the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)76 and the Ge-
netic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”)77 for
genetic privacy protection, but both HIPAA and GINA cover only
genetic privacy issues related to employment discrimination and im-
proper use of genetic information by insurance companies.78 HIPAA
was enacted in 1996 and is largely concerned with protections for pa-
tient privacy and health insurance coverage.79 HIPAA prohibits em-
ployers who provide health insurance coverage under a group plan
from using an individual’s genetic information as a criterion for cover-
age eligibility.80 In 2008, Congress enacted GINA to expand HIPAA
and prevent health-insurance providers from altering coverage terms
because of an individual’s genetic information.81 While GINA prohib-
ited insurers from using genetic tests as a basis to deny coverage, it
still permitted insurers to deny coverage based on a pre-existing ge-
netic disease.82 However, in 2010 Congress passed the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act, more commonly known as
“Obamacare,” which closed that loophole.83 GINA even went a step
further by extending these anti-discrimination protections to cover
employment, doing so by inserting “genetic information” to the list of
impermissible forms of discrimination.84 Employers may not base
their employment decisions on genetic data, nor may they ask for or
receive an employee’s genetic information unless an exception, such
as DNA testing for law enforcement purposes, applies.85 While these
federal provisions do address genetic privacy, they do not cover the
privacy risks relating to DTC genetic testing.
State legislative efforts also fail to address genetic privacy concerns
relating to DTC genetic testing and business transfer clauses. How-
75. Makdisi, supra note 20, at 975.
76. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
77. See generally Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
78. Makdisi, supra note 20, at 977 (discussing HIPAA); see Kerry Abrams & Bran-
don L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 757, 760–61 (2015) (dis-
cussing GINA).
79. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 78, at 769; CHIN ET AL., supra note 17.
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(F).
81. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 78, at 769; see Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act of 2008 § 105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9).
82. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 78, at 770.
83. Id. at 769–70; see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, § 2705(a)(6), 124 Stat. 119, 156 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
4(a)(6)).
84. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 §§ 201–210 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11).
85. Id. § 202 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1); see also Abrams & Garrett, supra
note 78, at 770.
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ever, many states have taken steps to protect genetic privacy “beyond
the protections provided for other types of health information.”86
State laws generally require an entity to obtain consent before it may
act on your genetic data.87 Sixteen states require a consumer to con-
sent before a third party can conduct or demand a genetic test or even
acquire genetic information, and twenty-four states condition genetic
information disclosure on informed consent.88 Further, eighteen states
have provided for specific penalties (civil, criminal, or both) for ge-
netic privacy violations.89 However, as is also the case at the federal
level, these state legislative efforts hardly address DTC genetic
testing.
In addition to the legislation at the federal and state level, the Fu-
ture of Privacy Forum released a Privacy Best Practices for Consumer
Genetic Testing Services (“Best Practices Guide”).90 The Future of
Privacy Forum, along with leading DTC genetic testing companies in-
cluding 23andMe and Ancestry.com, created the Best Practices
Guide.91 However, the Best Practices Guide is merely a guide, and in
no way are DTC genetic testing companies required to follow the
guidelines contained in it.92 It merely encourages companies in the
market to adopt certain privacy policies that can build consumer
trust.93 The Best Practices Guide establishes company privacy-policy
standards for handling consumer-created genetic data.94 The recom-
mendations included in the guide address: “(1) Transparency; (2) Con-
sent; (3) Use and Onward Transfer; (4) Access, Integrity, Retention,
and Deletion; (5) Accountability; (6) Security; (7) Privacy By Design;
and (8) Consumer Education.”95 The Future of Privacy Forum devel-
oped the Best Practices Guide “to ensure continued innovation and
consumer trust within the consumer genetic and personal genomic
testing industry.”96 While the Best Practices Guide serves as a good







90. Carson Martinez, Privacy Best Practices for Consumer Genetic Testing Ser-
vices, FUTURE OF PRIV. F. (July 31, 2018), https://fpf.org/2018/07/31/privacy-best-prac
tices-for-consumer-genetic-testing-services [https://perma.cc/DQ8R-Q5H2].
91. Id.




95. FUTURE OF PRIV. F., PRIVACY BEST PRACTICES FOR CONSUMER GENETIC
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starting point for the industry, it is not mandatory and therefore there
is nothing to ensure that DTC genetic testing companies will follow
the recommendations contained in it.
While some provisions at the federal and state level address genetic
privacy concerns, none cover privacy concerns relating to DTC ge-
netic testing, aside from requiring consent. Nor do any of the provi-
sions relate to the business transfer clauses contained in these
companies’ privacy statements. Despite the easily recognizable risk as-
sociated with these business transfer clauses, there is nothing stopping
a company from handing over a consumer’s DNA in the event of a
merger, sale, or acquisition. Therefore, safeguards should be put into
place to combat the risks associated with these business transfer
clauses.
IV. A SOLUTION TO THE BUSINESS TRANSFER CLAUSE
It is not hard to see the magnitude of privacy risks that business
transfer clauses pose to the consumer, and with the constant growth of
the DTC genetic testing market, it is important that the risks are ad-
dressed and mitigated.
A. Default Interpretation Standard
One possible solution that would mitigate the risks posed by the
business transfer clause is for companies to adopt a default interpreta-
tion standard, whereby companies read the business transfer clause as
requiring them to merge with, sell to, or be acquired by an entity with
like interests. This would mean that in the event a DTC genetic testing
company, such as 23andMe or Ancestry.com, goes through a sale, ac-
quisition, or merger, they will only sell to, be acquired by, or merge
with companies that have like interests as those of the genetic testing
company.
Toysmart.com, LLC agreed to a similar requirement in its litigation
with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and related bankruptcy
proceeding.97 After Toysmart’s creditors filed a petition for involun-
tary bankruptcy, Toysmart allegedly solicited bids for the purchase of
its assets, including its “Customer Lists.”98 Toysmart’s Customer Lists
included “consumers’ names, addresses, billing information, shopping
preferences, and family profile information.”99 However, Toysmart’s
privacy policy on its website stated that “Personal Information volun-
tarily submitted by visitors to our site, such as name, address, billing
information and shopping preferences, is never shared with a third
97. See generally FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-11341-RGS, 2000 WL
34016434 (D. Mass. July 21, 2000).
98. See First Amended Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable
Relief, FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-11341-RGS, 2000 WL 34016434 (D. Mass.
July 21, 2000), 2000 WL 34016406.
99. See id.
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party” and “[w]hen you register with toysmart.com, you can rest as-
sured that your information will never be shared with a third
party.”100 Despite this explicit language,  Toysmart allegedly at-
tempted to share this information by soliciting bids to sell all of its
assets, including customer information.101 The FTC and Toysmart ulti-
mately stipulated that Toysmart could only sell or assign its assets to a
company with like interests.102 The stipulated order stated that Toys-
mart “shall only assign or sell its Customer Information as part of its
Goodwill and only to a Qualified Buyer approved by the Bankruptcy
Court.”103 “Qualified Buyer” was defined as “an entity that (1) con-
centrates its business in the family commerce market, involving the
areas of education, toys, learning, home and/or instruction, including
commerce, content, product and services, and (2) expressly agrees to
be Toysmart’s successor-in-interest as to the Customer Informa-
tion . . . .”104 Therefore, Toysmart had to go back to the drawing board
and solicit bids to companies only with like interests.
The stipulation between the FTC and Toysmart can be applied to
the business transfer clauses contained in DTC genetic testing compa-
nies’ privacy statements. The default interpretation standard should
be that these companies, such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com, are only
allowed to transfer their assets—including their customers’ DNA—to
entities with like interests. After all, considering the personal and sen-
sitive nature of DNA, it is highly unlikely that consumers would ex-
pect their DNA to be transferred or sold to any company out there.
This solution would solve that problem. Instead of the company put-
ting its own interests first, the company would now have to balance
both its own interests and the consumer’s interests before transferring
any assets.
While ultimately Toysmart was unable to find a company to sell to,
thus resulting in all of its “Customer Information” being destroyed,105
this is an unlikely result for companies in the DTC genetic testing
market. This market is booming, with new companies entering and
existing companies leaving rapidly.106 Roughly 100 million people will
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. In re Toysmart LLC, No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr. E.D. Mass. filed July 21,
2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/toysmarttbankruptcy.
1.htm [https://perma.cc/YVG5-B2Q6] (“Stipulation and Order Establishing Condi-
tions On Sale Of Customer Information”).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Ultimately, the bankruptcy court never approved the order because there
were no offers to buy Toysmart’s database. Instead, the bankruptcy judge agreed to
allow Toysmart to sell its database to Disney, with the agreement that Disney would
destroy the customer list. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION
PRIVACY LAW 861–62 (5th ed. 2015).
106. Phillips, supra note 51, at 16, 22.
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use a DTC genetic test by 2021.107 With this increase in users comes
an increase in the monetary value of the market itself, thereby at-
tracting more companies. The DTC genetic testing market growth rate
may reach 22% annually during the next decade, and the overall mon-
etary value may exceed $6 billion by 2028.108 At this rate, the DTC
genetic testing market would be ten times as large as it was in 2017.109
Also worth noting, the growth in the market is not coming solely
from inside actors; some growth can be attributed to outsiders enter-
ing the market. Recently, the Mayo Clinic, a nonprofit focused on ed-
ucating, researching, and clinical practice,110 partnered with the DNA
sequencing business, Helix, to market Gene Guide, a testing kit that
“provides healthy customers with insights related to health and dis-
ease.”111 Based on the expected market growth, along with the rapid
increase of new entrants, it will be much easier for DTC genetic test-
ing companies to find other companies with like interests, the result
being the opposite of that in the Toysmart case.
Additionally, DTC genetic testing companies can go even further in
establishing consumer trust by providing customers with notice and
choice in the event of a sale, merger, or acquisition. Before the com-
pany transfers all of its data to the third-party entity, the company
should: (1) provide its customers with notice; and (2) allow them a
choice to opt-out. Opting-out would mean that consumers would in-
stead prefer their data to be deleted, rather than transferred to the
new entity. As FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson stated in the
Toysmart case, “[C]onsumers would benefit from notice and choice
before a company transfers their information to a corporate succes-
sor.”112 It is highly unlikely that when providing these companies with
their DNA, consumers expected or even thought about the potential
of their DNA, and the rest of their personal information for that mat-
ter, being transferred to another company. As Commissioner Thomp-
son put it, “[M]any of the consumers who disclosed their families’
personal information to Toysmart might not have been willing to turn
over the same information to the particular corporate entity that ulti-
mately succeeds Toysmart.”113 Commissioner Thompson goes on to
state this is true even where the company’s assets are transferred to a





110. About Mayo Clinic, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/about-mayo-
clinic [https://perma.cc/SR6Q-MPRJ].
111. Consumers Buy into Genetic Testing Kits, supra note 107.
112. Statement of Comm’r Thompson, Toysmart.com, LLC, FTC File No. X000075
(July 21, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/toysamrt
thompsonstatement.htm [https://perma.cc/82ZJ-U8MT].
113. Id.
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company with like interests.114 Further, he “urge[s] any successor to
provide Toysmart customers with notice and an opportunity to ‘opt-
out’ as a matter of good will and good business practice.”115
B. Types of Companies with “Like Interests”
With the above solution in mind, it is worth discussing what types of
companies have “like interests” as those of DTC genetic testing com-
panies. But before doing that, one must determine what the “inter-
ests” of these DTC genetic testing companies actually are. One
common goal of these companies is to provide consumers with infor-
mation on and access to their human genome, which allows consumers
insight into their origin, family tree, health history, and more.116
23andMe’s mission is to “help people access, understand and benefit
from the human genome.”117 Similarly, Ancestry.com wants to help
consumers understand their genealogy and historical background,
while also providing them with information relating to their families’
health.118 DTC genetic testing companies further advance the devel-
opments in the health industry through research.119 For example,
23andMe aims to change the scope of healthcare and disease preven-
tion by accelerating the pace and quality of research and by providing
people with power over their health data.120
Thus, companies with “like interests” would be dedicated to using
research to develop insights and breakthroughs in the healthcare in-
dustry, while also enabling consumers to learn more about their health
background and history. But what types of companies fall under that
umbrella? The first type that comes to mind is pharmaceutical compa-
nies. Like DTC genetic testing companies, pharmaceutical companies
want to prevent disease through the advancement of drugs.121 The
pharmaceutical industry prioritizes creating drugs that curb infections,
sustain wellness, and remedy diseases.122 As discussed above,
23andMe similarly operates to prevent disease and facilitate quality
114. Id.
115. Id.






117. Our Mission, supra note 116.
118. ANC., supra note 116.
119. Our Mission, supra note 116.
120. Id.
121. Sybil Prowse, An Easier Way to Understand the Pharma Industry, MKT. REAL-
IST, https://articles2.marketrealist.com/2019/12/easier-way-understand-pharma-indus
try/# (Dec. 9, 2019) [https://perma.cc/VK4C-W2CR].
122. Id.
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drug manufacturing.123 Additionally, pharmaceutical companies want
to use research to develop better solutions in the healthcare field.124
Over the last decade, the pharmaceutical industry has enhanced tech-
nology and infrastructure in the bioscience field using a research-ori-
ented philosophy.125 This research has helped with the development
of various formulations that target and mitigate infections, such as
HIV and cancer.126 Both pharmaceutical companies and DTC genetic
testing companies are devoted to using research to help prevent cer-
tain diseases. Ultimately, it seems as if pharmaceutical companies
have “like interests” as those of DTC genetic testing companies, as
their end goals are the same.
Any company dedicated to research in the medical field could be
considered as having “like interests” as those of DTC genetic testing
companies. Take, for example, medical marketing research companies.
These companies gather, study, and categorize patient health informa-
tion with attention to demographics and outcomes.127 Likewise, DTC
genetic testing companies also collect DNA data from consumers and
break it down in a way that allows consumers to understand it and
how it corresponds to certain illnesses and diseases. Therefore, medi-
cal marketing research companies would also have “like interests” as
those of DTC genetic testing companies.
There are many other companies out there that could be considered
as having “like interests” as those of DTC genetic testing companies.
This Article does not attempt to define every single one, but instead
explores what types of companies could qualify. When considering
what types of companies have “like interests,” it is important to re-
member those interests of the DTC genetic testing companies them-
selves: to use research to develop insights and breakthroughs in the
healthcare industry, while also providing more information to enable
consumers and others to learn more about their health background
and history.
C. Conformity to Industry Best Practices
Finally, the solution proposed here is in line with the recommenda-
tions contained in the Best Practices Guide.128 As discussed earlier,
leading companies in the market, including Ancestry.com and
23andMe, assembled the guide.129 This Best Practices Guide encour-
ages companies in the market to adopt certain privacy policies that
123. Our Mission, supra note 116.
124. See Prowse, supra note 121.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 26 Top Medical Marketing Research Companies for 2018, QUIRK’S MEDIA
(Oct. 2018), https://www.quirks.com/articles/26-top-medical-marketing-research-com
panies [https://perma.cc/WPH4-DG57].
128. FUTURE OF PRIV. F., supra note 95, at 7.
129. Martinez, supra note 90.
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can build trust with consumers.130 Focusing on the Use and Onward
Transfer section, the guide addresses the ability of companies to trans-
fer consumer data to other entities.131 The Best Practices Guide states
that the industry best practice is to only collect, use, and share genetic
data “in ways that are compatible with reasonable Consumer expecta-
tions for the context in which the data was collected.”132 The Best
Practices Guide recommends that in the event the company goes
through a sale, acquisition, or merger, the company “should either dis-
pose of Consumers’ Genetic Data and Biological Samples securely, or
ensure recipient third party commitments consistent with the original
notices provided to the Consumer.”133 Therefore, following the solu-
tion proposed here would also ensure that the DTC genetic testing
company conforms with industry best practices. By only selling to,
merging with, or being acquired by companies with like interests,
DTC genetic testing companies are ensuring that the consumer’s ex-
pectations are met and that the third-party company will only use the
consumer’s information in a way that adheres to the original privacy
policies that the consumer agreed to.
V. CONCLUSION
With the ever-growing popularity of DTC genetic tests, it is impor-
tant that the risks posed by these tests are mitigated, especially privacy
risks. And within this group of privacy risks comes the risk that is
posed by the business transfer clauses contained in DTC genetic test-
ing companies’ privacy policies. The business transfer clause allows
these companies to transfer all of their data—including the con-
sumer’s DNA—to any entity that they sell to, merge with, or are ac-
quired by, notwithstanding the third-party entity potentially having
completely different interests and goals. This poses a privacy risk to
the consumer who probably did not expect, or even know, that the
business transfer clause existed. With the lack of regulations address-
ing the privacy implications of DTC genetic tests, any solution must be
consumer-oriented. This Article urges DTC genetic testing companies
to interpret the business transfer clause as only allowing them to sell
to, merge with, or be acquired by entities with “like interests.” This
solution not only protects the consumer, but also conforms with indus-
try best practices. With the growing market and increase of new en-
trants, there will be many options for DTC genetic testing companies
to choose from, thereby making the solution an easy one to conform
with.
130. Id.
131. FUTURE OF PRIV. F., supra note 95, at 7.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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